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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JACQUELINE G. GOODWIN; RONALD G. CHAPEL; ROY E. CHRIST, JR.; 
 LEONARD J. LEMELLE, JR.; LYNETTE PASZEK, 




RONALD D. CASTILLE, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of Pennsylvania; 
DAUPHIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; THOMAS G. SAYLOR; J. 
MICHAEL EAKIN; MAX BAER; DEBRA MCCLOSKEY TODD; SEAMUS P. 
MCCAFFREY; JOAN ORIE MELVIN, In their official capacities as Justices of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
_____________ 
   
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(Civ. Action No. 1:11-cv-00979) 
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
















GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jacqueline G. Goodwin, Ronald G. Chapel, Roy E. Christ, Jr., Leonard J. Lemelle, 
Jr., and Lynette Paszek (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the July 19, 2011 Order 
of the District Court dismissing Appellants‟ action and denying Appellants‟ motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  Appellants allege that the seven Justices of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania (collectively, the “Judicial Appellees”) violated their constitutional rights 
by eliminating Magisterial District 12-1-03 prior to an upcoming election to fill the 
magisterial district judge vacancy in the district.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s Order.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
Pennsylvania‟s Unified Judicial System is a pyramidal structure of the State‟s 
court system.  At the base of this configuration are the magisterial district courts, courts 
of limited jurisdiction that hear minor criminal and civil matters in counties throughout 
the State.  There are over 500 magisterial district judges.  The Pennsylvania Constitution 
vests the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with the authority to structure magisterial 
districts.  Pa. Const. art. V, § 7. 
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Pursuant to this authority, on June 29, 2010, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
emailed all of the president judges in Pennsylvania‟s Unified Judicial System requesting 
that they evaluate the number of magisterial districts in their respective judicial districts.  
Based on economic concerns, the state supreme court sought to eliminate magisterial 
districts if a district judge position was, or was scheduled to become, vacant.  In February 
2011, Magisterial District Judge Joseph Solomon, of Magisterial District 12-1-03 (the 
“District”), informed Dauphin County President Judge Todd Hoover of his intent to 
retire.  President Judge Hoover wrote a letter to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
stating that the District would be vacant at the end of 2011 and recommended that it be 
eliminated and its caseload consolidated with that of other magisterial districts.  President 
Judge Hoover also informed the Dauphin County Board of Elections (the “Board of 
Elections”) of the potential District elimination and restructuring. 
Prior to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania‟s review of President Judge Hoover‟s 
recommendation, the Board of Elections printed unofficial ballots for the May 2011 
primary election to fill office vacancies in Dauphin County, which included the listing for 
the magisterial judge vacancy in the District, with Appellants listed as candidates.   The 
ballots did, however, provide notice that the District may be eliminated at the end of 
2011. 
On April 15, 2011, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued a per curiam order 
adopting President Judge Hoover‟s recommendation to eliminate the District at the end of 
2011 and stating that the magisterial judge vacancy in the District would not be reflected 
on the primary or general election ballot.  As a result, the next unofficial ballot for the 
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Dauphin County elections listed no candidates for the District vacancy, instead noting 
that the District would be closed at year‟s end.  After the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
approved President Judge Hoover‟s proposed redistricting plan, the Dauphin County 
Court of Common Pleas issued two administrative orders effectuating the elimination of 
the District and the impending reorganization.  Consequently, there was no magisterial 
district judge vacancy in the District to be filled in the May 2011 primary or the 
November 2011 general election. 
On May 20, 2011, Appellants filed suit against the Honorable Ronald Castille, 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in his official capacity, and the 
Board of Elections, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.  Appellants also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking 
to prevent the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania from eliminating the District and to have 
the magisterial district judge vacancy filled in the upcoming election.  The complaint was 
later amended to add as defendants all of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, in their official capacities (collectively, with the Chief Justice and the 
Board of Elections, “Appellees”). 
On July 19, 2011, the District Court denied Appellants‟ motion for a preliminary 
injunction, without an evidentiary hearing, and sua sponte dismissed Appellants‟ 
Amended Complaint.  Appellants filed a timely appeal. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a). 
5 
 
We review a district court‟s ultimate decision to deny a preliminary injunction for 
abuse of discretion, but we exercise plenary review over legal conclusions and review 
findings of fact for clear error.  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010).  We 
also exercise plenary review over a district court‟s decision to dismiss a complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 
F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Denial of Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
 
A district court must consider four elements in determining whether to grant a 
preliminary injunction:  (1) reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) 
irreparable injury to the moving party; (3) harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) the 
public interest.  Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  If 
the plaintiff is unable to establish that each element is in his favor, a preliminary 
injunction should not issue.  NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 
(3d Cir. 1999).  We agree with the District Court that Appellants cannot demonstrate any 
reasonable probability of success on the merits and will affirm the denial of Appellants‟ 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
The District Court provided several justifications for denying Appellants‟ motion.  
First, the District Court concluded that Appellees were entitled to legislative or quasi-
legislative immunity.  Second, the District Court determined that Judicial Appellees were 
not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Third, the District Court reasoned that Judicial 
Appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  Because 
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the first of these issues is dispositive, we need only address the District Court‟s 
application of legislative immunity. 
While judges are typically viewed as figures conferred with authority to perform 
judicial acts, it is sometimes appropriate for judges to perform certain enumerated 
legislative acts.  See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1988).  When judges act 
pursuant to their legislative authority, legislative immunity insulates judges, much like 
traditional legislators, from suits challenging those acts.  Supreme Court of Va. v. 
Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980).  Legislative immunity is a 
bar to claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 
253 (3d Cir. 1998), but it does not apply if the judge possesses the authority to “perform[] 
more than a legislative role” with respect to the contested conduct, such as independent 
enforcement authority.  Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. 
We employ a two-part test that an act must satisfy to be considered legislative: 
First, the act must be „substantively‟ legislative, i.e., 
legislative in character.  Legislative acts are those which 
involve policy-making decision [sic] of a general scope or, to 
put it another way, legislation involves linedrawing.  Where 
the decision affects a small number or a single individual, the 
legislative power is not implicated, and the act takes on the 
nature of administration.  In addition, the act must be 
„procedurally‟ legislative, that is, passed by means of 
established legislative procedures.  This principle requires 
that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the 
legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a 
legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the 
people which the governing body has been chosen to serve. 
 
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 774 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Ryan v. 
Burlington Cnty., N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989)).     
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In Gallas, we determined that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
were entitled to legislative immunity for an order eliminating the position of Executive 
Administrator of the First Judicial District and reorganizing the supervisory structure of 
the district.  Id. at 776-77.  Regarding the substantively legislative nature of the act, we 
reasoned that the Justices acted pursuant to a “direct grant of rulemaking authority” for 
their order addressing policy concerns.  Id. at 774.  As to the act‟s procedurally legislative 
character, we noted that the Justices followed established acceptable procedures—the 
circulation of proposals, deliberation, a vote, and the adoption of a proposal—to reach 
their decision.  Id. at 776. 
Judicial Appellees are similarly entitled to absolute legislative immunity for their 
April 15, 2011 order removing the magisterial district judge vacancy from the primary 
and general election and eliminating the District altogether.  Their decision to do so bares 
the same hallmarks of the legislative conduct immunized in Gallas. 
Turning to the first of our two-part inquiry, the April 15, 2011 order was a 
substantively legislative act.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has the authority to fix 
“[t]he number and boundaries of magisterial districts of each class within each judicial 
district.”  Pa. Const. art. V, § 7.  As in Gallas, this is a “direct grant of rulemaking 
authority from the state constitution.”  211 F.3d at 774.  Exercising this authority requires 
the performance of a function no different from those performed by the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly when it utilizes its constitutional power to pass legislation.  See id.   
Moreover, the order effectuated a general policy-making decision to reorganize 
the structure of the magisterial district courts.  Before eliminating the District and 
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removing the magisterial district judge vacancy from the election, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania emailed all of the president judges in Pennsylvania‟s Unified Judicial 
System, requesting that they “assess[] whether to eliminate any existing or upcoming 
vacant M[agisterial] D[istrict] J[udge] positions.”  (App. 235a.)  The economic concerns 
that spurred the inquiry only serve to highlight the policy considerations attendant to the 
decision. 
In addition, the April 15, 2011 order was procedurally legislative and was issued 
pursuant to a constitutionally valid protocol.  After asking for all president judges to 
assess the structuring of their respective magisterial districts, President Judge Hoover 
informed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the District would be vacant at the end 
of 2011 and recommended that this particular magisterial district judge position be 
eliminated.  The state supreme court adopted the recommendation in its April 15, 2011 
order and requested that President Judge Hoover submit a proposed reorganization plan.  
President Judge Hoover‟s recommended plan was approved, and the Dauphin County 
Court of Common Pleas issued two administrative orders effectuating the restructuring.  
We see no error in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania‟s reasoned analytical approach.1 
Appellants cite to Consumers Union for the proposition that, despite an assertion 
of legislative immunity, an injunction can issue against a justice of a state supreme court 
to prohibit that justice from enforcing an unconstitutional policy.  (Appellants‟ Br. at 19-
25.)  We take no issue with this proposition.  See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 736.  But 
                                              
1
 While not directly relevant to the state supreme court‟s decision-making process, 
throughout the deliberations, the Board of Elections provided notice of the closure on the 
unofficial ballots for the election and on its website. 
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we cannot agree with Appellants‟ argument that Consumers Union mandates an 
injunction against Judicial Appellees.   
In Consumers Union, the Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated a professional 
ethics code for attorneys practicing in the state.  Id. at 721-22.  Aggrieved by a provision 
regarding attorney advertising, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the provision was 
unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against its enforcement.  Id. at 725-26.  The 
Supreme Court of the United States concluded that the state supreme court‟s ability to 
independently enforce its ethics code by initiating disciplinary actions against attorneys 
who violated the provision rendered legislative immunity inapplicable for the state 
supreme court and its chief justice.  Id. at 734-36. 
Unlike Consumers Union, here Judicial Appellees have no independent 
enforcement mechanism regarding the April 15, 2011 order.  Judicial Appellees cannot 
initiate proceedings to facilitate the elimination of the District or the magisterial district 
judge vacancy from the Dauphin County election.  Appellants‟ reference to Judicial 
Appellees‟ power to impose sanctions and penalties against noncompliant parties is 
misplaced.  Such inherent enforcement mechanisms apply to properly constituted judicial 
proceedings before the state supreme court, which are not at issue here.  See 
Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (Pa. 2008) (discussing a court‟s 
authority to punish a party acting in contempt in judicial proceedings). 
Appellants cannot demonstrate any reasonable probability of success on the merits 
of their claims.  Judicial Appellees are entitled to legislative immunity for the decision 
embodied in their April 15, 2011 order.  We will therefore affirm the denial of 
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Appellants‟ motion for a preliminary injunction.  See McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 
F.3d 521, 528 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that plaintiffs having no chance to succeed on 
merits was dispositive in preliminary injunction analysis).
2
  Because Appellants 
acknowledge that the Board of Elections had no involvement in the decision-making 
process (App. 351a), given Judicial Appellees‟ legislative immunity, we agree with the 
District Court that a preliminary injunction by extension cannot issue against the Board 
of Elections.   
B. Dismissal of the Amended Complaint 
 
Based on Judicial Appellees‟ legislative immunity, the District Court also sua 
sponte dismissed Appellants‟ Amended Complaint.  Although the District Court failed to 
identify under what procedural rule it dismissed the Amended Complaint, we surmise 
that dismissal was in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 842 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding 
that legislative immunity was grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)).  We have noted 
that sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper after service of process, Oatess v. 
Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 (3d Cir. 1990), but that it should be exercised with 
caution to ensure that the decision to dismiss is an informed one, Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 
F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008). 
This is the rare case where sua sponte dismissal was appropriate.  The District 
Court had sufficient facts to determine that legislative immunity was an absolute bar to 
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Appellants‟ action.  Appellants could present no additional facts that would militate 
against a finding of legislative immunity.  We will affirm the District Court‟s sua sponte 
dismissal of Appellants‟ Amended Complaint.3 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s Order. 
                                              
3
 Although the District Court did not articulate whether dismissal was with or 
without prejudice, the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits and therefore assumed 
to be with prejudice.  See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). 
